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Book Reviews
Social Justice and the Liberal State
Bruce Ackerman
Yale University Press, 1980, 416 pp. , $17.50.
Ackerman has given us another look at what is perhaps th e most important
m oral and political struggle of our day. On the one side are those of us who
believe, as did Pope John XXIII, that God 's law is immanent in human nature. On
the oth er side are Ackerman's kind of liberals who believe all political organizations ought to be neutral regarding questions of good and evil. Good Pope John
wrote in his famous encyclical Pacem in Terris that peace depends upon the moral
order revealed by God in the human nature He created:
Peace on earth, which all men of every era have most eagerly yearned for,
can be firmly established only if the order laid down by God be dutifully
observed.
The progress of learning and the inventions of technology clearly show
that, both in living things and in the forces of nature, an astonishing order
reigns, and they also bear witness to the greatness of man , who can understand that order and can create suitable instruments to harness those forces
of nature and use them to his benefit.
But t h e progress of science and the inve ntions of technology show above
all the infinite greatness of God, Who created the universe and man himself.
He created all things out of nothing, pouring into them the abundance of
His wisdom and goodness, so that t h e h o ly psalmist praises God in these
words: ' 0 Lord our master, the majesty of thy name fills all the earth.' . ..
How strongly does the turmoil of individual m en and peoples contrast
with the perfect order of the universe! It is as if the relationships which bind
them together could b e controlled only by force.
But the Creator of the world h as imprinted in man's heart an order which
his conscience reveals to him and enjoin s him to obey: 'This shows that the
obligations of the law are written in their hearts: their conscience utters its
own testimony.' .. .
Bu t fickleness of opinion often produces this error, that many think that
th e relationships between man and States can b e governed by the same laws
as the forces and irrational elements of the universe, whe reas the laws
governing them are of quite a different kind and are to be sought elsewh ere,
namely, where t he F ather of all things wrote them , that is, in the nature of
man.
(Excerpts from the first six paragraphs of the encyclical, N .C.W.C. translation, St. Paul Editions.)
In sharp contrast, Ackerman says:
... nobody has the right to vindicate political authority by asserting a privileged insight into the moral universe which is denied the rest of us. A power
structure is ille gitimate if it can be justified only through a conversation in
which some person (or group) must assert that he is (or they are) the
privileged moral authority:
Neutrality. No reason is a good reason (for exercising power) if it requires
the power holder to assert:
a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of
his fellow citizens, or
b) tha t, regardless of his conception of the good, he is intrinsically superior to one or more of his fellow citizens (pp. 10-11).
For Ackerman , political power should be exercised under constraints generated
by, and scarce resources allocated according to, the deliberations of a universal
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dialogue in which no one claims to know what actually is good when another
citizen participating in the dialogue claims he cannot see it, and in which no one
claims superiority of any kind . All participants must be able to say to each other,
"I'm at least as good as you are" (p . 66 and throughout the book). Thus Ackerman proposes another liberal convention in the face of what he thinks is legitimate agnosticism regarding the natural law.
The dilemma is real. Either morality is conventional and subjective (e.g., Ackerman's liberalism), or it is part of the real order of things which we do not make
up - i.e., morality is objective, as in Pope John's understanding of the nature of
man.
[Th ere have been many attempts to circumvent this dilemma and find a middle
ground. Kant, for example, set the tone for the German Enlightenment by proposing a middle ground between these two positions. Morality would be subjective in
that he claimed no knowledge of reality apart from man's mind as a source for
moral principles, but it would have certai n "objective" characteristics in that he
mistakenly believed that we could find substantive universal principles immanent
in ou r reason apart fro m any metaphysical or religious knowledge of realities
beyond our reason. I believe that this effort, all ow ing for notable exceptions such
as Alan Donegan 's recent work, has notoriously failed to result in anything practically different from the conventional morality of liberalism. Donegan's book,
The Theory of Morality (University of Chicago, 1977), which stands in wonderful
contrast to Ackerman's, does not h ave the political clout of the latter ' s brand of
liberalism, and seems impotent in the face of it. One reason is that Donegan, the
Kantian, cannot ground the tradition al morality of the family in reason alone, and
withou t that morality his opposition to abortion, for example, is without force.
So once again the middle-ground collapses, practically speaking, into the conventiona l morality of liberalism . )
Ackerman is proposing a new convention to replace earlier ones such as the
traditional social contract and Utilitarianism's felici fic calculus or even more
recent conventions such as Rawls's justice as fairness, because critics h ave demonstrated that these conventions cannot consistently generate principles for constraining political power where such constraint is absolu tely needed. Ackerman
believes his convention will succeed where others have failed.
It is regrettable that Ackerman exhibits no real knowledge of how natural law
theorists and others who defend knowledge of an objective moral order propose
constraining the power of the state, because Ackerman's only real appeal is to a
sense of fair play in the face of a bug-a-boo. He believes that claims to know the
truth about what is objectively good lead to paternalism and even to tyranny . Ironically , liberalism's historical failures, both in the face of the rise of private
economic power under liberal capitalism and in face of the rise of modern
tyrannies, particularly of the Nazi and Communist varieties, provide persuasive
reasons for believing (as I do) that liberalism cannot generate effective principles,
let a lone self-consistent principles, for the constraint of power. Liberalism leads,
as C. S. Lewis said, to The Abolition of Man.
The principal reason for liberalism's fai lu res is clear in Ackerman ' s work. No
liberal convention, not even Ackerman's, includes everybody within the convention; so, not every instance of innocent human life is protected from arbitrary
killing by either the state or private individuals. (Directly killing the innocent
would be wrong even if thought not to be "arbitrary.") Some human beings are
left out of all conventions. To include everybody, we must appeal to truths about
which liberals insist on remaining agnostic. In effect, we must appeal to knowledge of the sacred value of every in nocent human life . This truth has been greatly
amplified, if not simply discovered, by Hebrew-Christian faith . I might say that it
has been very especially amplified in our day by the transcendent knowledge and
religious faith of Catholics li ke Pope John XXIII and Pope John Paul II.
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Ackerman's liberal convention excludes, at least, unborn babies. No unborn
baby can say to a citizen, "I'm at least as good as you are," because the baby
cannot yet speak. Ackerman, with that blindness the psalmist called foolishness,
does not see that the exclusion is arbitrary. He thinks it is well-reasoned. But no
amount of specious reasoning can discount the fact that a vast number of innocent and flourishing human lives are terminated (i.e., directly killed) by those who
practice abortion. The "reason" this group is singled ou t for slaughter is not a
reason; it is as arbitrary as using race as a "reason" for discrimination. I repeat
that directly killing the innocent, which is what abortion is, would be wrong even
if choosing to allow the direct killing at will of members of this group (which
consists of unborn human babies) were not arbitrary. But in fact it is arbitrary,
and the fact that its arbitrariness is merely disguised by specious reasoning means
that inevitably some citizens will argue effectively that yet another group can be
excluded from the convention and therefore killed at will by either the state or
private individuals. Unborn babies are simply not the only people who cannot
insist that "I'm at least as good as you are," and you have got to be able to
maintain that in order to belong to Ackerman's convention.
For example, I do not think that many who accept Ackerman's arguments for
abortion will find his arguments against infanticide compelling. Ackerman believes
the "right" to an abortion is so broad that he will allow the majority to restrain
abortions only when they are instances of what he would consider wanton
cruelty - people conceiving babies (he calls them fetuses) only for the fun of
having them aborted. In the face of this concession he actually thinks the follow'ng argument would check infanticide:
By the time a fetus is viable outside the womb, the problem (of killing)
has changed in two respects. First, the biological parents have had time to
consider whether they want to be parents. While the right to abortion
typically protects against the failures of contraception, this rationale seems
weaker when the parents allow so many months to pass. Second, once the
infant is viable, some other adult may want to take on the task of child
rearing. The question, then, is whether a "natural" parent has the right to
kill the child rather than transfer it to a parent who wants to "adopt" it.
This is not a rhetorical question. We have already seen, in chapter 2, that
Ascetic does have the right to burn his fair share of manna despite the fact
that others think he is "wasting" it. Moreover, a day-old infant is no more a
citizen than a nine-month fetus. What is required, then, is a liberal argument
for denying citizens the right to kill their newborn children while saving
their right to consume other forms of material reality in the way they think
best.
I can think of at least two. The first emphasizes the rights of the adoptive
parents. To make the case easy, assume that the adoptive parents are
infertile and that, for second-best reasons, they are denied access to a testtube baby. It follows that these people have been consigned to a power
structure that denies them a prima facie right they may value dearly. A very
minimal second-best response might be to guarantee them access to children
who would otherwise be killed by their "natural" parents.
A second argument extends the principle against wanton cruelty developed in our discussion of abortion. In the present case, the "natural"
parents have it within their power simply to pass the child on to another,
yet they prefer to kill it instead. What other reason can they give for their
action but their desire to impose pain upon mute creation (pp. 128-129)?
Liberalism's ruminations, when they do not abet killing, as in the case of
abortion , are simply impotent before Cain's urge to kill. Although sin remains,
that fear of God which is the beginning of wisdom , is not completely impotent
before the urge to kill the innocent. Knowledge of the objective moral order can
lead to tha t fear.
It seems unnecessary to add that acceptance of Ackerman's liberal convention
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would lead to a worsening of the situation in medical practice today, if for no
other reason than what we have seen - he rationalizes abortion on demana.
Therefore, I do not recommend the book. But if you are not familiar with the
contemporary liberal mind, Ackerman's book will abundantly satisfy your curiosity.
- Richard R. Roach, S.J., Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Moral Theology
Marquette University

Clinical Ethics: A Practical Approach
to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine
Albert R. Johnsen, Ph.D. ; Mark Siegler, M.D.;
and William J. Winslade, Ph.D., J.D.
Macmillan, New York, 1982, xvii + 187 pp.
This book is designed to be a desk reference in medical ethics for practicing
physicians. It is ordered to the practical resolution of concrete cases that clinicians
frequently face, and it explicitly avoids becoming involved in abstruse theoretical
arguments, ethical theories and speculation. A very well organized book, it enables
physicians to come to ethical judgments in the same manner that they formulate
clinical judgments, for the text employs the contemporary medical clinical diag·
nostic model used in medical practice.
There are many serious problems with this book, the least of which is the belief
that one can adequately analyze ethical situations in a manner analogous to the
way in which clinical problems are analyzed. The practical ethical judgments and
suggestions made in this work are based on a subjective, intuitive, utilitarian and
quality-of-life theory of ethics, and little mention is made of the weaknesses of a
theory such as this. No justification is given for the adoption of this theory of
ethics, and this could easily lead unsuspecting clinical practitioners to believe that
there is general agreement abou t the validity of this theory and the suggestions
derived from it. While this book gives very detailed accounts of specific medical
cases, the moral principles invoked to resolve these cases are often ambiguous and
confused. For example, it is suggested that practitioners ought to respect the
desire of some patients to die with dignity and have active euthanasia imposed on
them. But elsewhere, readers are warned of the legal dangers of becoming involved
in assisting in the death of patients. As a result, the reader is left in a state of
doubt as to whether cooperation in this practice should be offered.
The utilitarian and anti-speculative approach of this work creates serious difficulties for the clinical practitioner. This is because the work assumes that sound
ethical judgments can be reached by a "rough" weighing of the values involved in
specific cases. The problem with this approach is that more than a "rough"
weighing of values is required for sound resolution of the truly difficult ethical
cases. The difficult moral cases, those which seriously challenge the capabilities of
an ethical theory, are those in which the values in conflict are very similar in
nature. It is easy to decide what is to be done when one is deciding between silk
purses and sows' ears. But when one must compare the equally incomparable
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